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Public consultation on strengthening the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement

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Introduction

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High quality and reliable corporate reporting is of key importance for healthy financial markets, business investment and economic growth. The <u>EU corporate reporting framework</u> should ensure that companies publish the right quantity and quality of relevant information allowing investors and other interested stakeholders to assess the company's performance and governance and to take decisions based on it. High quality reporting is also indispensable for cross-border investments and the development of the <u>capital markets union (CMU)</u>.

In the context of this consultation, corporate reporting comprises the financial statements of companies, their management report that includes the non-financial and corporate governance statements and country-by-country reporting. It would also include sustainability information pursuant to the <u>proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive</u>.

The consultation takes into account the outcomes of the 2018 consultation on the EU framework for public reporting by companies and the 2021 fitness check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies. This consultation however focuses on companies listed on EU regulated markets (hereafter 'listed companies' or 'issuers'), that is a subset of the companies subject to public reporting requirements under EU law. Please note that in terms of reporting, this consultation does not seek the views of stakeholders on the applicable accounting standards, such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the standards in the Accounting Directive, or the views of stakeholders on public country-by-country reporting or the Commission's proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.

The 2018 consultation did not cover the areas of corporate governance or statutory audit. Therefore, this consultation contains questions to evaluate aspects of the Audit Directive 2006/43/EC and of Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU. However, it covers the EU framework on corporate governance only in so far as relevant for corporate reporting by listed companies and the statutory audit of so-called public interest entities (PIEs). Listed companies, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and entities designated as such by Member States are PIEs.

This consultation also builds on the work carried out by the <u>European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)</u> and the <u>Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies (CEAOB)</u>.

This consultation is divided into 5 parts

- The first part seeks your views about the overall impact of the EU framework on the three pillars of high quality and reliable corporate reporting - corporate governance, statutory audit and supervision. It also seeks your views about the interaction between the three pillars
- The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the corporate governance pillar, as far as relevant for corporate reporting. It aims to get your feedback in particular on the functioning of company boards, audit committees and your views on how to improve their functioning
- The third part focuses on the statutory <u>audit pillar</u>. The first questions in this part aim at getting your views on the
 effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the EU audit framework. It focuses in particular on the changes
 brought by the <u>2014 audit reform</u>. Subsequently, the questions aim to seek views on how to improve the
 functioning of statutory audit
- The fourth part asks questions about the supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms
- Finally, the consultation will ask questions about the supervision of corporate reporting and how to improve it

This consultation will directly feed into an impact assessment that the Commission will prepare in 2022 with a view to possibly amend and strengthen the current EU rules.

Please note: In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact <u>fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu</u>.

More information on

- this consultation
- the consultation document
- the consultation strategy
- company reporting
- the protection of personal data regime for this consultation

About you

- *Language of my contribution
 - Bulgarian
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antonis.diolas@accaglo	obal.com		
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	Trade repositories
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	Not applicable
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	Professional Accountancy Body

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. Fo r the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, 'business association, 'consumer association', 'EU citizen') country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published. Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected

*Contribution publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

Anonymous

Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the personal data protection provisions

Part I - The EU framework for high quality and reliable corporate reporting

The EU framework for corporate reporting has developed significantly since the EU adopted the <u>fourth company law Directive (Directive 78/660/EEC)</u> which coordinated the national provisions on the presentation, content and publication of annual accounts and management reports of limited liability companies. This Directive also already required a statutory audit of the annual accounts of limited liability companies.

Today, the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU, the Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EU) and Audit Regulation (537/2014) and the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC provide the main requirements that ensure the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement in the EU. Moreover, the ESMA Regulation (EU)1095/2010 gives tasks to ESMA in relation to corporate reporting. Given the inclusion of the Transparency Directive in the scope of the ESMA Regulation ESMA can make use of its powers in the ESMA Regulation, such as to issue guidelines.

The main elements of this framework that guarantee the quality and reliability of corporate reporting can be summarised as follows

- Corporate governance:
 - Responsibility of company boards for corporate reporting; the establishment by PIE's of an audit committee to minimise risks and to enhance the quality of financial reporting
- The requirements for a statutory audit of the annual accounts to ensure that there are no material misstatements
- S u p e r v i s i o n :
 The supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms to ensure the quality of audits and the supervision of corporate reporting by listed companies to ensure the quality of corporate reporting

The three pillars of the corporate reporting framework can be mutually reinforcing. At the same time, weaknesses in one pillar also negatively impact other pillars. Appropriate responsibilities and supervision of company boards provide incentives to company boards to focus on the quality of their corporate reporting. It will also incentivise them to see statutory audit not as a burden, but as an important external check by statutory auditors. On the other hand, where company boards are insufficiently accountable and supervised, there is a risk that boards may pay insufficient attention to the quality of reporting and that they provide insufficient resources for a proper audit.

Question 1. As a user of corporate reporting (retail or wholesale investor, credit rating agency, NGO, public authority, employees, suppliers, other stakeholders), what is the relative importance of the information contained therein compared to other sources of information?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium
- 4 High
- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 2. How do you assess the overall effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the EU legislation, considering each of the pillars underpinning corporate reporting individually, but also in combination with each other?

a) Corporate governance

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	©	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	•	•	•	©	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	©	©	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	©	•	•	•	•	•

b) Statutory audit

1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable

I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	•	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

c) Supervision by public authorities of statutory auditors/audit firms

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•

III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

d) Supervision by authorities of corporate reporting

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	©	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU	©	©	©	•	©	•

frameworks / internal coherence						
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	©	•	•	•	©	•

e) The eco-system composed of all of the above

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	•	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

Question 2.1 Please describe the main issues that you see, if any, in the four areas mentioned in question 2 and in the eco-system composed of all four areas. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- have any factors reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

2a) Although there has been evolution throughout the years in respect of EU corporate governance, this has not been consistent amongst member states and as a result they are at different stages of development. This is because members mainly rely on local Corporate Governance codes and local law rather than at an EU Corporate Governance level. We support further harmonisation at the EU level.

2b) – 2d) The past EU reform reviews on statutory audit noted in the consultation, focused on further transparency on the financial information of companies, on auditor's independence via mandated measures, on enhancing competition and improving the supervision of statutory auditors. They also focused on the coordination of audit supervision by competent authorities in the EU. As we note in our response to Question 10, the past reforms have been effective in respect of the rules on independence of auditors and firms, the rules regarding the content of the audit and the auditor report, the rules on non-audit services and the rules on transparency reporting. However, we consider that the rules on auditor/audit firm rotation have not been as effective given the divergence on implementation amongst members states. In respect of audit supervision, as we note in our response to Questions 15 and 15.1 we believe that there is scope for the role of the CEAOB to be developed and strengthened to underpin greater consistency. In our view, this will also promote a more efficient approach as those subject to supervision do not need to adjust their systems and procedures to accommodate significantly different approaches across different member states.

2e) It is vital to recognise that each pillar of the ecosystem needs to be addressed separately but in a coordinated way in order to overcome the issues identified in this consultation. We therefore welcome this initiative.

The <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020</u> notes that supervisors undertook the examination that year of 729 financial statements drawn up in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Based on these examinations, European enforcers took enforcement actions against 265 issuers in order to address material departures from IFRS. This represents an action rate of 38%.

As regards the audit sector the <u>Commission's market monitoring report</u> highlights deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems, but also in individual files for audits of PIEs. National audit oversight bodies also report that part of statutory audits is not up to standards.

Question 3. Based on your own experience how do you assess the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by listed EU companies?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium
- 4 High
- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 3.1 Please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment in question 3 and explain the consequences that the quality and reliability of corporate reporting or lack thereof has on you.

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

The quality of corporate reporting and compliance with IFRS can certainly be improved. Academic studies confirm this, for example Tsalavoutas, I. Tsoligkas, F. & Evans, L. (2020). Compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements: a review and synthesis of the relevant literature, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 40 (September 2020), 100338.

Detailed input from our members in Central and Eastern Europe highlights that the quality of corporate reporting varies significantly across Member States. Different levels of compliance with IFRS are driven by the accounting regime in place in the MS before IFRS adoption, differences in tax treatments, the size and maturity of the capital market, and cultural factors including attitudes towards compliance. It is likely that the level in more developed and larger capital markets is significantly higher. Therefore, it is not useful to consider the EU as one block; and actions to improve the quality of corporate reporting will likely depend on the specific circumstances of the MS.

While the quality of financial reporting from large listed entities is generally good, the quality of financial reporting is poor among smaller listed entities in some MS with limited flows of capital. Because of the small size of these capital markets, the impact on constituents of poor quality corporate reporting may be limited: this could benefit from further analysis.

The quality of corporate reporting is linked to preparers', auditors' and enforcers' familiarity with IFRS. Education of accountants is an important remedial factor, but its effects take time to show through. Therefore, we expect the quality of corporate reporting in smaller MSs to improve naturally over time – we have observed this trend in Western Europe over the past years.

Question 4. There are no generally accepted standards or indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting and of statutory audit, nor the effectiveness of supervision. In light of this, what are your views on the following questions?

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Would it be useful to have specific indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	©	©	0	©	•	•
Is it possible to have clear and reliable indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audit and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	0	0	•	0	0
Should the European Commission develop indicators on the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	0	•	©	0	0

Question 4.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and, where relevant, please suggest possible indicators of the quality and reliability of corporate reporting, statutory audit and supervision, where possible with concrete examples:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Overall, we are very supportive of the usefulness of specific quality indicators for corporate reporting, statutory audit and supervision. The development of quality indicators by the European Commission could be a useful high-level mechanism for benchmarking and measurement of headline aspects of audit quality, corporate reporting and effectiveness of their supervision. ACCA's "Tenets of good corporate reporting" and Tenets of audit quality" are a good source of possible indicators (Please see https://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/technical-activities/technical-resources-search/2018/february/tenets-of-good-corporate-reporting.html and https://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/professional-insights/global-profession/Tenets-of-quality-audit.html).

Many companies and audit firms have already developed their own Audit Quality Indicators (AQIs) and we are supportive this supplementing the generally accepted ones, as an additional layer of quality indicators at the firm level. It is important that AQIs consider a company's specific operating environment.

Care though should be taken on the interpretation of AQIs and their use should not be considered as a panacea of audit quality. In our view, AQIs can give a good, but not absolute, indication of audit quality, but not all aspects of audit quality can be measured in quantitative terms.

Question 5. In your view, should the Commission take action in the areas of the corporate governance pillar, the statutory audit pillar, the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms and the supervision of corporate reporting to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes, there is a need to improve the some or all of the areas listed above
- Yes, there is a need to improve some or all of the areas listed above as well as other areas
- No, but there is a need to improve other areas than those listed above
- No, there is no need to take further action in any area
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Please indicate to what extent you think the Commission should take action in each of the areas below to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies:

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Improve the corporate governance pillar	0	0	0	•	0	0
Improve the statutory audit pillar	0	0	0	•	0	0
Improve the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms	0	0	0	•	0	0
Improve the supervision of corporate reporting	0	0	0	•	0	0

Question 5.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and where appropriate describe what actions you would prioritise and why, with concrete examples:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We strongly support the Consultation's approach to consider the three pillars of high quality and reliable corporate reporting as part of the wider financial reporting ecosystem. We agree that improvements on corporate governance, statutory audit and supervision should take place in a coordinated way and that all three can be mutually reinforcing towards improved quality of corporate reporting, quality of audits and supervision.

Question 5.2 At what level should action be taken to improve the quality of corporate governance, audit, audit supervision and/or supervision of corporate reporting?

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Companies themselves should take action to improve their reporting	0	0	0	•	•	•
Auditors themselves should take action to improve audits	0	0	0	•	©	0
Audit supervisors themselves should take action to improve their functioning	0	0	0	•	•	•
Individual Member States should take action if the situation in their market requires this	0	0	0	•	0	0
The EU should take action	0	0	0	•	0	0
Several of the above should take action	0	0	0	•	0	0

Question 5.3 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 5.2:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We are supportive of the multi-stakeholder approach taken in improving the quality of corporate governance, audit and their supervision. We agree with the Consultation's proposals on the stakeholders mentioned above (Question 5.2), as we believe that each of them plays an important role towards the sustainable improvements of the quality of the wider financial reporting ecosystem.

Question 6. To what extent is there a need to modify the EU framework on corporate reporting to support the following objectives?

	1 (not at all necessary)	2 (rather not necessary)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather necessary)	5 (highly necessary)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. The green transition	0	0	0	0	•	©
II. The digital transition	0	0	0	•	0	©
III. Facilitating doing business by SMEs	0	0	0	•	0	©
IV. Reducing burdens and/or simplification	0	0	0	0	•	0
V. Better corporate social responsibility, including tax transparency and fair taxation	0	0	0	0	•	©

Question 6.1 Please provide, if needed, any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 6:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We are very supportive of the European Commission's adopted set of proposals found in the European Green Deal relating to climate, energy, transport and taxation. Modifying the EU framework to support the above-mentioned objectives, would promote the improvement of the quality of the wider financial reporting ecosystem and its three main pillars as identified by this consultation

I and V) ACCA's thought leadership paper 'Tax as a force for good: Rebalancing our tax systems to support a global economy fit for the future' recommends a number of actions for authorities (EU in this instance) and for business relating to some of the above objectives. For example, using the tax revenues to reduce taxes on labour and expand social protection, in particular addressing the needs of lower-income households. Another recommendation is for governments to work with other countries to adopt a regional approach to achieve the same environmental and social objectives. This lays the ground for global coordination and the EU could play a key role here particularly in amongst the member states. This report can be found in the following link: https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/ACCA_Global/professional-insights/Tax-as-force-forgood/pi-environmental-tax.pdf.

ACCA has published a series of reports relating to all of the above set objectives. Please also refer to our response to the call for evidence for further details. All reports can be accessed in the following link: https://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/professional-insights.html

Part II - Corporate governance

The EU corporate governance framework focuses on the relationships between company boards, shareholders and other stakeholders, and therefore, on the way a company is managed and controlled. The framework consists of a combination of EU and Member State legislation and soft law, namely national corporate governance codes applied on a 'comply or explain' basis. It aims inter alia to provide protection for shareholders and other parties with a particular interest in companies, such as employees and creditors.

A <u>sustainable corporate governance initiative</u> is planned to be adopted by the Commission in 2021. (In addition, the <u>Commission's study on directors' duties and sustainable corporate governance, July 2020</u>, assesses the root causes of 'short termism' in corporate governance and discusses their relationship with current market practices and/or regulatory frameworks).

Key features of the EU framework on corporate governance that are relevant for corporate reporting are

- The collective responsibility of the members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of a company for drawing up and publishing annual financial statements and management reports
- The requirement for a statement by the persons responsible within the issuer that, to the best of their knowledge, the financial statements prepared give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the issuer
- The requirement for PIEs to establish, in principle, an audit committee

Question 7. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU framework on corporate governance, considering how they underpin quality and reliability of corporate reporting?

a) Board responsibilities for reporting

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	©	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	•	0	0	•

b) Liability of company boards for reporting

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence						

with relevant	©	0	•	0	0	
EU rules						

c) Obligation to establish an audit committee

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	0	0	•	0

d) Rules on the composition of the audit committee

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence						

with relevant	0	•	0	0	0	0
EU rules						

e) Tasks of the audit committee

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	0	•	0

f) External position of the audit committee (e.g. in relation to shareholders)

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence						

with relevant	0	•	0	0	0	©
EU rules						

Question 7.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, as regards corporate governance and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Regarding audit committees (ACs), all public interest entities (PIEs) should have a separate audit committee and there should be no MS options on this requirement.

We believe that it would be helpful if the 'duties' of audit committees (AC) are further explained and better defined and also in relation to other committees. For example, it would be helpful in cases where there are 'audit and risk committees' since it would be mandatory to do for some sectors and sizes.

Further, more clarity is needed around the duties relative to other stakeholders. This also applies with how their duties and position compare to the external auditor and these other stakeholders. There should be more detailed definition of duties and engagement between the AC and investors too. AC's relationship with all these is key in genuinely understanding the risk and ensuring the integrity of the reporting of it. The biggest issue worth improving would be alignment of the various directives and initiatives, being mindful of overlaps or ways organisations can plan and adopt constructively.

Another point widely agreed by our relevant EU members is being more specific about both directors' duties and the AC's role in sustainable corporate governance versus other board committees. More detail and guidance on who owns what (and why) and how they work together collectively would be helpful.

There should be more specific guidance on qualifications for directors, especially from the ESG perspective, as many ACCA members who sit on boards are referring to this and indeed are keen to get the thought diversity, composition, and expertise right. Of course, this would vary from sector to sector, but so many companies are challenged by the ESG expertise and data gathering not only for reporting but for making decisions and steering strategies.

Question 8. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS reported

in the ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020, to what extent can such departures be attributed to deficiencies of the EU framework on corporate governance?

- 1 Not at all
- 2 To a limited extent
- 3 To some extent
- 4 To a large extent
- 5 To a very large extent
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 8.1 Please explain the main issues you see, and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We have noted under Q3 a number of issues that may lie behind non-compliance with IFRS. The audit committee is a key element of the corporate governance framework that influences this and a lack of members with adequate relevant knowledge and experience is the main issue.

Question 9. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

a) Strengthen the (collective) responsibilities of the board / tasks for reporting / liability of boards for incorrect reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

b) Require proper expertise of specific board members in relation to corporate reporting (internal controls, accounting framework, sustainability reporting, etc.)

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

c) Increase the responsibilities of specific board members (e.g. Chief Executive Officer or the Chief Financial Officer) and their liability on corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

d) Give company boards an explicit responsibility to establish effective risk management and internal control systems for the preparation of corporate reporting, including as regards controls for risks of fraud and going concern

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	©
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

e) More transparency of company boards about the effectiveness of the companies' risk management and report on the actions undertaken during the reporting period

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

f) Remove exemptions in EU legislation for establishing an audit committee

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

g) Increase the tasks of the audit committee, e.g. for providing assurance on internal control systems for the avoidance of risk and fraud and going concern

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

h) Strengthen the external position of the audit committee (e.g. vis-à-vis the auditor or by reporting to shareholders)

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

i) Require the setting up of specific whistle blowing procedures inside listed companies and supervisors of corporate reporting to strengthen the protection of whistle blowers

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	©
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

j) Require auditors to provide assurance on the systems and internal controls implemented by the board, including fraud, going concern and related reporting requirements

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

k) Strengthen the role of shareholders on corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

Question 9.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

9.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 9.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Q9d) and Q9e) Giving company boards an explicit responsibility to establish effective risk management and internal control systems for the preparation of corporate reporting, including as regards controls for risks of fraud and going concern would enhance the quality and reliability of listed companies' corporate reports. We also believe that transparency of company boards about the effectiveness of the companies' risk management and reporting on the actions undertaken during the reporting period, would also enhance the quality and reliability of reporting of listed companies. We do note that quality via transparency would be even more enhanced if companies also report on the actions taken during the reporting period in regards to fraud and going concern – it is unclear whether the intention is for fraud and going concern to be included as per Q9e).

Q9j) Requiring auditors to provide assurance on the systems and internal controls implemented by the board, including fraud, going concern and related reporting requirements would enhance quality of reporting for listed entities. However, we emphasise on the comment made above, that company boards should also be transparent by reporting on the actions taken during the reporting period relating to fraud and going concern for this to be effective.

Q9g) It is unclear whether this is referring to the monitoring tasks of the audit committee. We therefore clarify that we find this to be effective only if the intention is to enhance the audit committee's role in monitoring the effectiveness of internal quality control and risk management systems and financial reporting process which would include fraud and going concern.

Q9i) In our view this would be very effective as it would incentivise more whistle-blowers to come forward if there is a mechanism in place that protects them.

Question 9.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We believe that the role of shareholders on corporate reporting should be strengthened. This aligns with our recommendations for governments or other relevant local bodies (at EU level in this case) to consider how the communication channels between auditors and shareholders could be enhanced, which could help narrow the knowledge gap for both fraud and going concern as noted in our recently published thought leadership report https://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/professional-insights/global-profession/closing-

expectation-gap-audit_way-forward.html. This also supports our view on Q9k above.

Another point that our research suggest is that governments or other relevant local bodies depending on the jurisdiction should explore the development of a database of fraud case studies following a root cause analysis in their respective markets, which could be used as an educational tool for audit practitioners. This could be at the EU level.

Part III - Statutory audit

The overall objective of statutory audits is to ensure that financial statements are free from material misstatements and provide a true and fair view. The auditor has to identify and assess the risk of material misstatements and gather sufficient and appropriate audit evidence as the basis for his opinion that the financial statements provide a true and fair view and to publicly report on the results of his audit work. The EU audit rules promote audit quality and seek to ensure the independence of auditors and audit firms.

Therefore, the final objective of statutory audit is to contribute to the quality and reliability of financial statements of companies.

Question 10. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency and the coherence with other relevant EU frameworks of the key features of EU audit legislation in so far as it applies to PIE auditors and audit firms?

a) The rules on independence of auditors/audit firms and absence of conflicts of interest

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	0	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	0	0	0	0

b) The rules on the content of the audit and of the audit report

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	•	•	0	0

c) The rules applicable to non-audit services

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	•	•	•	•	0

d) The rules on auditor/audit firm rotation

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	0	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	©	©	©

e) The rules on transparency (transparency report, additional reports to other parties / audit committees / supervisors)

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	0	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	0	0	•	0	0

Question 11. Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in the audit pillar and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

10c) Auditors are currently firmly restricted by the current EU audit legislation and the IESBA's Code of Ethics from providing non-audit services to their existing PIE audit clients as this could impair their independence. However, the evolving needs on reporting, and therefore assurance, over non-financial information, show that there are some types of assurance services which are intertwined with the financial statement audits and which do not compromise auditor's independence, for example assurance over sustainability and other non-financial information as is currently being discussed in the CSRD. Therefore, we are of the view that auditors should not be excluded from this type of assurance services.

Further, care needs to be taken in the precise definition of "non-audit services". The assurance provided over sustainability information, for example, requires careful consideration, as inadvertently excluding the statutory auditor from being able to provide this service should it be deemed "non-audit" would not be a sensible outcome. Therefore, we believe that there is more scope for clarity in this area, before further limiting the scope for auditors to provide non-audit services.

10d) With regard to the auditor/audit firm rotation, while the existing EU audit regulation allows for flexibility in its implementation, this has also resulted in diverging rules among member states. These differing rules may create additional barriers therefore we suggest higher harmonisation.

Question 12. To which extent you agree to the following statements?

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Statutory audits contribute as much as is possible to the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by PIEs	©	•	•	•	0	•
II. I am satisfied with the role of the statutory auditors / audit firms of PIEs	©	0	0	•	0	•
III. The work of auditors is reliable so I trust their assessment and reports and their work inspires trust in capital markets	©	0	0	•	0	0
IV. There is not enough choice for public interest entities in finding an audit firm at appropriate costs	0	0	•	0	0	0
V. Joint audits contribute to the quality of audit	0	•	0	0	0	0

12.1 If you want to add any comments, and/or mention specific issues you see you can insert them here. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

12IV) and 12V) Overall, we do not support the introduction of joint audits as also noted in the previous ACCA consultation response to the UK on Competition and Market Authority recommendations (please see our CMA 2018 response https://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/technical-activities/technical-resources-search/2019 /september/beis-sas-consultation-on-cma-recommendations.html).

Our position reflects the fact that there is no existing study with sufficient evidence suggestion that joint audits would contribute to audit quality. We also believe that improved audit quality rather than increased competition per se should be the focus of audit reform proposals.

The audit quality issues that occur most often at EU level are

- deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems
- the lack of, or inappropriate, monitoring of high-risk audited entities
- and the lack of audit evidence and documentation.

Question 13. To what extent can these quality issues be attributed to deficiencies in the EU legal and supervisory framework for statutory audit?

- 1 Not at all
- 2 To a limited extent
- 3 To some extent
- 4 To a large extent
- 5 To a very large extent
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 13.1 Please explain, and where possible, provide evidence for your assessment under question 13:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We consider that these audit quality issues can be attributed only to some extent to deficiencies in the EU legal and supervisory framework, as additional, more stringent, regulation will not necessarily lead to higher audit quality and fewer deficiencies.

We would rather suggest more emphasis to be placed on the implementation and further harmonisation of the existing EU framework. Further, we welcome initiatives which would help in the increase of audit quality via learning and educational experience within the audit profession. For example, the creation of a Fraud Register in the EU with existing cases, would be an excellent educational tool aiming at improving the audit quality in the future.

Question 14. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality of statutory audits of PIEs?

a) Ask auditors to disclose how they have assured the directors' statement on material fraud, and what steps they have taken to assess the effectiveness of the relevant internal controls and to detect any fraud

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

b) Strengthen the informational value of audit reports

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	©	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

c) Improve the internal governance of audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	©	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

d) Incentivise or mandate the performance of joint audits for PIEs, including to enhance competition on the PIE audit market

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	•	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

e) Further harmonise the rules on mandatory rotation

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	©	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

f) Limit the scope for statutory auditors and audit firms to provide non-audit services

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	•	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

g) Increase or eliminate caps on auditor liability, at least for cases of gross negligence of statutory auditors

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	•	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

h) Limit the number of Member State options in the EU Audit framework to ensure consistency across the EU and to incentivise cross-border statutory audits

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

i) The creation of a passporting system for PIE auditors and audit firms, allowing auditors to provide their services across the Union based on their approval in a Member State

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

Question 14.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of statutory audits of PIEs?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

14.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 14.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

- 14a) We support auditors reporting on whether the directors' statement on material fraud is factually accurate, rather than how they have assured it, as currently stated in a) above. Similar to our response Q42 of the BEIS consultation in UK, we suggest that the EC is mindful of the risks associated with the additional reporting requirement, avoiding a new expectation gap being introduced. There is a great risk that the perception is that the auditor is providing a conclusion on fraud rather than reporting on the directors' statement on fraud. This also raises questions regarding the auditor's liability and potential increase in indemnity insurance.
- 14b) We clarify that we find that currently audit reports are informative, however, there is room for improvement, particularly, in the areas of fraud and going concern by both management and auditors. Our report https://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/professional-insights/global-profession/closing-expectation-gap-audit_way-forward.html includes relevant findings supporting this.
- 14c) Improving the internal governance of audit firms should be on-going as it is fundamental for achieving high quality PIE audits. The UK, although no longer a member state, introduced the Audit Firm Governance Code in 2010, revised in 2016 and consulted for further revisions in 2021.
- 14d) We do not support the introduction of joint audits as there are no conclusive evidence that joint audits enhance audit quality. Please also see our answer to Question 12.1.
- 14e) and 14h) We believe that the rules on rotation should be harmonised given the current differences in implementation by members states due to the flexibility provided in the EU audit legislation. We therefore support limiting the number of Member State options in the EU Audit framework to ensure consistency across the EU.

Question 14.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

- 14f) See our response to Q10c).
- 14i) There are significant barriers such as the expertise in local law/tax and language as well as local law

restrictions that may be in place. These barriers create further risks which could be damaging audit quality rather than enhancing it.

Part IV - Supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

National competent authorities are responsible for the approval and registration of statutory auditors and audit firms, the adoption of audit standards, quality assurance and investigative and administrative disciplinary systems.

At European level, the cooperation between competent authorities is organised within the framework of the <u>Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies (the 'CEAOB')</u>. The CEAOB has different tasks aimed at supervisory convergence, but it has no power to take binding decisions (Article 30 <u>Audit Regulation</u>).

Question 15. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU supervisory framework for PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

a) The supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms in the EU

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	0	0	•

b) The establishment and operation of national audit oversight bodies

		1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
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I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	•	•	•	•

c) The Member State systems for investigations and sanctions

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	0	0	0

d) The role of the CEAOB

1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable

I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	•	•	•	•

Question 15.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in relation to the supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment. You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Whilst we are supportive of the objectives that underpinned the setting up of the CEAOB, we do not consider that its operation has been successful in achieving the desired consistency across members states in audit inspection approach and methodology. We believe, therefore, that there is scope for the role of the CEAOB to be developed and strengthened to underpin greater consistency. This will also promote a more efficient approach as those subject to supervision do not need to adjust their systems and procedures to accommodate significantly different approaches across different member states. With all of that said, however, we recognise that bringing about a greater degree of harmonisation in audit oversight approaches will require significant focus and effort.

Question 16. Considering the findings in the Commission monitoring report
and reports of national audit oversight bodies how would you rate the quality
of audit supervision?
1 - Very low

0	2 - Low
0	3 - Medium
0	4 - High
0	5 - Very high
0	Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

16.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 16, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:

2	2000 character(s) maximum	
ind	cluding spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.	

Question 17. How effective and efficient would the following actions be to increase the quality and effectiveness of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

a) Ensure better the independence and appropriate resources of supervisors of auditors and audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

b) Increase the transparency of audit supervisors

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

c) Increase the consistency of supervision of cross-border networks of audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

d) Ensure supervision of audit committees

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

e) Harmonise and strengthen the investigation and sanctioning powers of audit supervisors

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

f) Ensure that at European level there are legal instruments available that ensure supervisory convergence as regards statutory audit of PIEs

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

g) Grant a European body the task to register and supervise PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	©	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	•	0	0	0	0	0

Question 17.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

0	Vac
	1 45

- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

17.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 17.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We would draw the attention of the Commission to relevant proposals on the matters outlined above in the current consultation on corporate reporting and auditing taking place in the UK. This includes proposals for enhanced transparency around the reporting of the findings of the audit inspection process, of which ACCA is supportive. We are likewise supportive of the focus on appropriate resourcing supervisors of auditors and audit firms, in support of a robust overall system of supervision.

With regard to the final proposal, to grant a European body the task to register and supervise PIE statutory audit firms and auditors, this does not seem to us to be a practical or cost-effective proposition, in terms of the work that would be required to implement such a solution, and the timeframe over which it could be introduced. Instead, ACCA would support development using existing national supervisory institutions, but with more EC-wide prescription over the nature of supervision and the supporting approach to be implemented, supported by strengthened oversight from the CEAOB.

Question 17.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

See answer to 17.1 above.			

Part V - Supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting

The supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting refers to the examination by competent authorities of listed companies' compliance with the disclosure obligations stemming from the applicable reporting framework, as well as taking appropriate measures when infringements are identified.

Based on enforcement activities by national competent authorities, ESMA reports a significant level of material misstatements. In the follow up of the Wirecard case and based on its experience, ESMA recommended a number of actions to improve the enforcement of corporate reporting (see ESMA letter of 26 February 2021 to the Commissioner McGuinness on next steps following Wirecard - ESMA32-51-818).

The <u>Transparency Directive</u> includes a number of requirements relating to supervision of corporate reporting

- the designation of a central competent authority in each Member State. For the enforcement of corporate reporting, Member States may designate a competent authority other than the central authority and/or delegate tasks to other entities
- national central competent authorities must be independent from market participants. There are no specific provisions as regards the independence of other designated authorities. As regards entities with delegated tasks, the entity in question must be organised in a manner such that conflicts of interest are avoided and information obtained from carrying out the delegated tasks is not used unfairly or to prevent competition
- Member States must provide competent authorities with certain powers, including investigative powers
- ESMA is tasked to foster supervisory convergence as regards the enforcement of financial statements prepared
 in accordance with the IFRS. For this purpose it has adopted in <u>2014 guidelines on the enforcement of financial</u>
 information

This part of the consultation complements the <u>Commission targeted consultation on the supervisory convergence and the Single Rulebook</u> from 12 March 2021 to 21 May 2021.

Question 18. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS in the financial statements of listed companies found in the <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020</u>, how would you rate (on a scale of 1 to 5) the degree to which such departures can be attributed to deficiencies in the EU supervisory framework?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium
- 4 High
- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

18.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 18, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Material departures are caused by a wide range of factors as highlighted in our response to Q3, but they are influenced by deficiencies in the EU supervisory framework.

Currently, each MS applies the EU supervisory framework in different ways, which leads to different levels of supervisory reviews, sampling methods, resources and expertise available. As noted in our response to Q3,

different supervisory approaches may well be needed in different MS, but we would recommend further analysis of current supervisory practice across MSs and their effectiveness.

It should be noted that IFRS are principles-based standards: the application of certain standards requires a high degree of judgement. It would therefore be necessary to review the nature of the material departures which have led to enforcement action: differences in the interpretation of IFRS should be distinguished from fraudulent or erroneous reporting.

Question 19. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

a) Clarify the role and responsibilities of the national authorities charged with the enforcement of corporate reporting and entities to whom the supervision of corporate reporting is delegated/designated, and improve their cooperation

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

b) Improve the system for the exchange of information between authorities and entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting, and other relevant national authorities

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

c) Strengthen the rules ensuring the independence of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

d) Increase the resources of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

e) Increase the powers for national competent authorities to enforce corporate reporting, such as forensic, powers to obtain any necessary information from banks, tax or any other authorities in the country, powers to request information and corrective actions, etc.

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

f) Improve cooperation and coordination between national authorities of different Member States

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

g) Increase transparency on the conduct and results of enforcement activities by national authorities

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

h) Strengthen the role of ESMA on the enforcement of corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

Question 19.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

19.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 19.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Some inconsistencies in IFRS application arise from a lack of common practice and policies among smaller accounting practices. To address this, it would be helpful for regulators to establish common "best practices" for smaller audit firms, especially where a global network or guidance does not exist.

We have observed that giving supervisory bodies the power to require corrective action (restatement of financial statements) is particularly key to improving the quality of corporate reporting.

Transparency about the enforcement actions taken and the circumstances given rise to enforcement action is very helpful. ESMA's publication of enforcement decisions provides preparers and auditors with a valuable point of reference to guide more consistent application of IFRS. It would be beneficial, in addition to the enforcement decisions, to publish information about the subsequent impact of each enforcement decision on the entity's reporting.

Some actions would be appropriate to the circumstances of specific MS. In some MS, growing the number of qualified professional accountants on the staff of the supervisory bodies could lead to more effective supervision. Similarly, in some MS the independence of the national authorities needs to be strengthened. Action will need to be informed by a more detailed analysis of deficiencies in the supervisory framework on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction level.

Question 19.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

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See ou	ır respor	ise to	19.1.1
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Additional information

Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) below. Please make sure you do not include any personal data in the file you upload if you want to remain anonymous.

The maximum file size is 1 MB.

You can upload several files.

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

Useful links

More on this consultation (https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-corporate-reporting_
Consultation document (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-document_en)

Consultation strategy (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-strategy_en)

More on company reporting (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing_e

Specific privacy statement (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/specific-privacy-statement_en)

More on the Transparency register (http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en)

Contact

fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu